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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MACK HALLADAY and MERLE 
HALLADAY, 
Plaintiffs-
Appellants, 
vs. 
MADGE CLUFF, PERRY K. BIGELOW 
and NORMA G. BIGELOW, 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Case No. 18032 
THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE 
IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS 
CASE BECAUSE THERE WAS NOT MUTUAL 
ACQUIESCENCE BY ADJOINING LANDOWNERS FOR 
A LONG PERIOD OF YEARS. 
Over the years, this court has issued a great number and 
variety of decisions dealing with the issue of boundary by 
acquiescence. As noted by Chief Justice Henriod, these 
decisions have "produced a Joseph's Coat of many colors" 
respecting the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. In more 
recent opinions, this court has commonly set forth four 
elements which establish a presumption that a certain line has 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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become a boundary by acquiescence. Those four elements are: 
(1) occupation up to a visible line marked definitely by 
monuments, fences, or buildings and (2) acquiescence in the 
line as a boundary (3) for a long period of years (4) by 
adjoining landowners. Fuoco v. Williams, 15 Utah 2d 156, 389 
P. 2d 143 (1964). If the party claiming boundary by acquiescence 
cannot establish all of these four elements, there can be no 
boundary by acquiescence. 
The requirement that there be adjoining landowners is one 
of common sense. A third party cannot be deprived of his 
property by the agreement or acquiescence of neighboring 
parties. Any such ouster must result by compliance with the 
requirements of adverse possession. 
Only in the "rarest of cases" will the court establish a 
boundary by acquiescence where the period of acquiescence is 
less than 20 years. King v. Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 135, 378 P. 2d 
893 (1963); Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corp., 530 P. 2d 792 
(Utah 1975). 
Acquiescence has been variously defined by the court. 
Essentially, if a party has acquiesced in a certain line as a 
boundary for more than 20 years, the court implies an agreement 
that the boundary between the respective parties' properties 
shall be fixed at that point. Obviously, such an implied 
agreement is not conclusive. A party may rebut such a presump-
tion by evidence that there was no agreement or that there 
could not have been a proper agreement between the parties. 
-2-
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Wright v. Clissold, 521 P. 2d 1224 (Utah 1974). Furthermore, 
any such agreement would be void and unenforceable if the true 
boundary is known and the agreement does not result from the 
settlement of a dispute as to the correct boundary. Otherwise, 
the statute of frauds relating to the transfer of real property 
would be violated. Tripp v. Bagley, 276 P. 912 (Utah 1929). 
Subsequent to the filing of plaintiffs' earlier brief, 
this court issued its opinion in Madsen v. Clegg, 639 P. 2d 
726 (Utah 1981) wherein the court stated: 
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has 
long been recognized, and when the location of the 
true boundary between adjoining tracts of land is 
unknown, uncertain or in dispute, the owners 
thereof may, by parol agreement, establish the 
boundary line and thereby irrevocably bind them-
selves and their grantees. However, when the true 
boundary is known, any parol agreement of the 
owners establishing the boundary elsewhere is void 
and unenforceable by virtue of the statute of 
frauds, which requires a conveyance of real property 
to be in writing. 
This court has determined that in the absence of 
an express agreement as to the location of the 
boundary between adjoining owners, the law will 
imply an agreement fixing the boundary as located, 
if it can do so consistently with the facts appear-
ing. However, when the evidence fails to support-
any implication that a fence has been erected by 
adjoining owners pursuant to an agreement between 
them as to the location of the boundary, the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has no applica-
tion. 
639 P. 2d at 728, 729. 
Plaintiffs have set forth their theory with respect to 
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence in their prior brief. 
In this brief, plaintiffs will attempt to respond only to the 
allegations raised in defendants' briefs. Plaintiffs concede Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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that there is an ancient fence which has been in existence for 
more than 50 years and that none of the parties know the reason 
for its being built. Plaintiffs also acknowledge that defendants 
Cluff and Bigelow have on various occasions occupied property 
within the disputed P-N-M-0 area on Appendix A. However, 
assertions made in defendants' briefs with respect to the other 
three requirements for establishing a presumption of boundary by 
acquiescence, are not correct. 
Defendant Cluff bases her argument almost entirely on the 
proposition that the parties recognized the M-N fence as a 
boundary between their respective properties. Defendant Cluff 
makes many assertions which appear to be incorrect restatements 
of the testimony. At pages 5 and 6 of defendant Cluff's brief 
it is asserted that the fence line M-Y and the fence line M-N is 
a continuation of the fence line around the property formerly 
owned by Madge Cluff's father, Mr. Durnell, and was for the 
purpose of establishing the property line between the Halladays 
and the Durnells. However, what Mr. Elmo Halladay actually 
testified was as follows: 
Q. So those fence lines between points "M" and 
"N" and points "X" and "Y" on Exhibit 8 have 
been there at least 50 years? 
A. Easy. I would say around 50 years, yes. 
Q. And maybe before? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, what was the purpose of this old fence 
that runs between point "X" and point "Y" on 
plaintiffs' Exhibit 8? 
-4-
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A. That divided the property between our 
place and, I think, Brother Durnell, who 
owned it at that time. That was Madge's 
father. 
Q. Did you ever speak with anybody about 
any kind of problem related to that fence 
line? 
A. No, we never had no problems then. We 
was always very good friends all the time. 
We was very good friends. 
(R. 162-263). 
Clearly, Elmo Halladay was testifying with respect to the 
X-Y fence line and not the M-N fence line involved in this 
appeal. The X-Y fence line divided the property, not the M-N 
fence. Furthermore, it was the X-Y fence line that he was 
referring to when he said there was no dispute about the 
fence. 
Defendant Cluff then cites a statement by plaintiff Mack 
Halladay that when he bought the Boardman piece, parcel 1 on 
Appendix A, he intended to occupy to the M-N fence line. 
(Respondent's Brief p. 9). However, defendant Cluff does not 
indicate to the court that when plaintiff Halladay purchased 
the Boardman piece, (1965) that plaintiff Halladay had already 
purchased the A-B-C-D property from Mayor Collard (1958) and 
therefore he owned the property up to the fence line. Defendant 
Cluff's quotation from the record is clearly not accurate and 
is intended to have the court believe that plaintiff Halladay 
purchased the Boardman piece with the intent of occupying to 
the fence line without actually receiving a deed to the 
property below the fenceline. However, plaintiff Halladay 
-s-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
already owned that property. 
Both defendants Cluff and Bigelow further attempt to show 
that plaintiffs acquiesced in the M-N fence as a boundary by 
alleging that plaintiffs purchased the A-B-C-D property for 
the purpose of clearing title to the land already owned by 
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' reason for purchasing the A-B-C-D 
parcel has absolutely nothing to do with acquiescence in the 
M-N fence as a boundary line. Plaintiff or his father already 
held record title up to the fence line prior to purchasing the 
P-M-N-0 property from Mayor Collard. By purchasing that 
property, plaintiffs not only cleared up whatever record title 
problems they may have had, but also purchased additional 
ground. At the time plaintiffs purchased the A-B-C-D property, 
defendant Perry Bigelow testified that plaintiff Mack Halladay 
told him that he had purchased property in Mr. Bigelow's 
backyard. (R. 277). Plaintiff Halladay knew that he was 
purchasing property beyond the M-N fence line. 
Defendants have cited no testimony or evidence in the 
record indicating any affirmative acquiescence by plaintiffs 
with respect to the M-N fence line, and plaintiffs have been 
unable to find any such evidence in the record: There is 
evidence that at the time plaintiffs purchased the property 
from Mayor Collard and that during the ten year period im-
mediately preceding trial, plaintiff informed defendant Bigelow 
that he owned the property and that defendant Bigelow should 
not do anything with it. Furthermore, in 1978 plaintiff Halladay 
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prevented Perry Bigelow from building a potato cellar on the 
property. (R. 178, 277-278). 
Although defendants cite Lane v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 1199, 
505 P. 2d 1199 (19730) for the proposition that acquiescence 
is more akin to indolence or inaction, essentially such 
indolence is found to form an implied agreement that the 
parties recognize a particular line as a boundary. To constitutE 
a valid agreement which does not run afoul of the statute of 
frauds, there must be a dispute or uncertainty as to the 
correct boundary between the parties' respective properties. 
In the present case, there is neither dispute nor uncertainty 
as to the correct boundary, nor is there a basis to find an 
agreement between the parties. It i1 undisputed that the 
record titles of defendants Bigelow and Cluff do not include 
the P-M-N-0 parcel. When he purchased the P-M-N-0 property in 
1958, plaintiff Mack Halladay knew that that boundary extended 
beyond the fence line and he so informed Perry Bigelow. 
The testimony appears to be undisputed that defendant Cluff 
and plaintiff Halladay have never had any discussion with 
respect to the M-N fence as a boundary between their properties 
prior to the initiation of this lawsuit. According to Madsen 
v. Clegg, supra, any implied agreement between defendant Cluff 
and plaintiffs that the M-N fence is a boundary runs afoul of 
the statute of frauds and is void. 
Furthermore, for a presumption of boundary by acquiescence 
to arise, the alleged boundary must be between adjoining 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
landowners and there must be mutual acquiescence in the 
boundary for a long period of years, usually in excess of 20 
years. Until 1958, plaintiffs were not adjoining landowners 
to defendants, at least as to the M-N property line. Until 
1961, plaintiffs did not own any property north of defendant 
Cluff's property other than the disputed parcel. (Trial 
transcript of February 5, 1981, page 18). In 1975, defendant 
Cluff and defendants Bigelow were involved in litigation with 
each other as to the east-west boundary between their properties. 
At that time, defendant Cluff had prepared a plat of the 
property lines which indicated that her north boundary was 
approximately 50 feet short of the M-N fence line. (R. 232, 
February 25, 1981 Transcript, p. 18, Ex. 13). Thus, even if 
there was acquiescence by plaintiffs in the M-N fence as a 
boundary line, such acquiescence was not between adjoining 
landowners for a long period of years. 
Plaintiffs further argue that the real purpose of the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence is to settle land titles. 
On the other hand, it is the established law of this jurisdiction 
that one cannot transfer property by parol agreement. "Land 
cannot be conveyed from one person to another by merely a 
change in possession, even though such change in possession 
continues.for a long period of time." Tripp v. Bagley, supra, 
at 918. In their present case, plaintiffs knew that the M-N 
fence was not the boundary of their property and they so 
informed defendant Perry Bigelow when they purchased it. This 
-8-
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is not a case wherein the parties are in dispute as to the 
location of the true boundary and agree that a certain line 
shall become the boundary between the respective properties. 
In this case, plaintiffs owned to the M-N fenceline, they 
subsequently purchased ground south of the M-N f enceline, and 
now defendants are attempting to obtain title to the property 
subsequently purchased by plaintiffs. "When the true boundary 
is known, any parol agreement of the owners establishing the 
boundary elsewhere is void and unenforceable by virtue of the 
statute of frauds, which requires a conveyance of real property 
to be in writing." Madsen v. Clegg, supra, citing Tripp v. 
Bagley, supra. The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
therefore has no application to the present case and the 
judgment of the lower court should be reversed with respect 
to the P-M-N-0 property. 
CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence is clearly not 
applicable to the facts of this case. The evidence shows 
that plaintiffs have never affirmatively acquiesced in the 
M-N fence as a boundary line, and thus any showing of ac-
quiescence must result from plaintiff's nonuse of the property. 
Any implied agreement that plaintiffs accepted the M-N fence as a 
boundary line is rebutted by the evidence which shows that as to 
defendant Cluff there was never any dispute or uncertainty as to 
the boundary and with respect to defendants Bigelow, plaintiff 
affirmatively told said defendants on many occasions that he 
-9-
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judgment with respect to the P-M-N-0 property and quiet title to 
that property in plaintiffs. 
Dated: July .E::, 1982. 
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